Verify Releases
Prove that the Archestra image you run is the one Archestra released, and see every package inside it, without trusting the registry. Each release image carries signed attestations next to it in its registry: where it was built, its SBOM, and a scan for live credentials. gh, cosign, and admission controllers such as Kyverno read them.
What Each Image Carries
Every attestation is signed with a GitHub Actions identity from Archestra's release run, and logged in the public Sigstore transparency log.
| Attestation | Tells you | Predicate type | Signed by |
|---|---|---|---|
| Build provenance | The repository, commit, and workflow run that built the image | https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1 | archestra-ai/archestra/.github/workflows/release-please.yml |
| SBOM (SPDX) | Every package in the image, in SPDX 2.3 | https://spdx.dev/Document/v2.3 | archestra-ai/.github/.github/workflows/release-publish.yml |
| SBOM (CycloneDX) | The same packages, in CycloneDX | https://cyclonedx.org/bom | archestra-ai/.github/.github/workflows/release-publish.yml |
| Secret scan | How many credentials a scan found, by type and whether they were live | https://archestra.ai/attestations/secret-scan/v1 | archestra-ai/.github/.github/workflows/release-publish.yml |
They cover docker.io/archestra/platform, plus mcp-server-base, p4-shim, sandbox-base, and agent-* under ghcr.io/archestra-ai/.
What to know:
- The SBOMs list the
linux/amd64image. Thelinux/arm64image is built from the same source and is covered by the same provenance. - An image with a live credential is never released. The secret scan holds counts only, never a secret or where it was found.
Verify Archestra Images
Check the platform image your cluster runs. Each command exits non-zero for an image Archestra did not release.
IMAGE=$(kubectl -n archestra get deployment archestra-platform \
-o jsonpath='{.spec.template.spec.containers[0].image}')
DIGEST=${IMAGE#*@}
# Built by Archestra's release workflow
gh attestation verify "oci://docker.io/archestra/platform@$DIGEST" \
--repo archestra-ai/archestra --bundle-from-oci
# Its SBOM, from the same release run
gh attestation verify "oci://docker.io/archestra/platform@$DIGEST" \
--repo archestra-ai/archestra --bundle-from-oci \
--signer-workflow archestra-ai/.github/.github/workflows/release-publish.yml \
--predicate-type https://spdx.dev/Document/v2.3
To check without gh, use cosign with the issuer https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com and the release workflow's identity:
cosign verify-attestation --new-bundle-format --type slsaprovenance1 \
--certificate-oidc-issuer https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com \
--certificate-identity-regexp '^https://github\.com/archestra-ai/archestra/\.github/workflows/release-please\.yml@refs/heads/(main|release/[0-9]+\.[0-9]+)$' \
"docker.io/archestra/platform@$DIGEST"
Stable releases come from refs/heads/release/<major>.<minor>, release candidates from refs/heads/main.
Scan the SBOM
Feed an image's SBOM to your vulnerability scanner instead of pulling and scanning the image yourself. Verify and extract it in one command:
gh attestation verify "oci://docker.io/archestra/platform@$DIGEST" \
--repo archestra-ai/archestra --bundle-from-oci \
--signer-workflow archestra-ai/.github/.github/workflows/release-publish.yml \
--predicate-type https://cyclonedx.org/bom --format json \
| jq '.[0].verificationResult.statement.predicate' > platform.cdx.json
- Dependency-Track and other CycloneDX tools: upload
platform.cdx.json. - Grype, Trivy, and license tools: use
--predicate-type https://spdx.dev/Document/v2.3to get the SPDX file, then rungrype sbom:platform.spdx.jsonortrivy sbom platform.spdx.json.
Admit Only Archestra Images
Make your cluster refuse any Archestra image that Archestra's release workflow did not build. Kyverno and Sigstore policy-controller run in your cluster next to the chart. The chart does not install either.
-
Kyverno: this
SigstoreBundlepolicy rejects a pod whose Archestra image fails the provenance check. Pods with other images pass through.yamlapiVersion: kyverno.io/v1 kind: ClusterPolicy metadata: name: verify-archestra-images spec: webhookTimeoutSeconds: 30 rules: - name: archestra-build-provenance match: any: - resources: kinds: [Pod] verifyImages: - type: SigstoreBundle failureAction: Enforce imageReferences: - "docker.io/archestra/platform*" - "ghcr.io/archestra-ai/mcp-server-base*" - "ghcr.io/archestra-ai/p4-shim*" - "ghcr.io/archestra-ai/sandbox-base*" - "ghcr.io/archestra-ai/agent-*" attestations: - type: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1 attestors: - entries: - keyless: issuer: https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com subjectRegExp: '^https://github\.com/archestra-ai/archestra/\.github/workflows/release-please\.yml@refs/heads/(main|release/[0-9]+\.[0-9]+)$' rekor: url: https://rekor.sigstore.dev -
Sigstore policy-controller: set
signatureFormat: bundlein aClusterImagePolicywith the issuer and identity above. See Sigstore bundle format. -
GKE Binary Authorization: its Sigstore signature check verifies only public-key signatures in Artifact Registry, so it cannot check these attestations. On GKE, use Kyverno or policy-controller.
What to know:
- To admit release candidates nowhere, drop
main|from the identity pattern. - A registry mirror must copy the attestations with the image:
oras cp -r <image>@<digest> <mirror>/<image>does. Point the policy's image references at the mirror. - An older release may have its attestations on GitHub only. If
--bundle-from-ocifinds none, drop the flag to check with GitHub instead.