Verify Releases

Prove that the Archestra image you run is the one Archestra released, and see every package inside it, without trusting the registry. Each release image carries signed attestations next to it in its registry: where it was built, its SBOM, and a scan for live credentials. gh, cosign, and admission controllers such as Kyverno read them.

What Each Image Carries

Every attestation is signed with a GitHub Actions identity from Archestra's release run, and logged in the public Sigstore transparency log.

AttestationTells youPredicate typeSigned by
Build provenanceThe repository, commit, and workflow run that built the imagehttps://slsa.dev/provenance/v1archestra-ai/archestra/.github/workflows/release-please.yml
SBOM (SPDX)Every package in the image, in SPDX 2.3https://spdx.dev/Document/v2.3archestra-ai/.github/.github/workflows/release-publish.yml
SBOM (CycloneDX)The same packages, in CycloneDXhttps://cyclonedx.org/bomarchestra-ai/.github/.github/workflows/release-publish.yml
Secret scanHow many credentials a scan found, by type and whether they were livehttps://archestra.ai/attestations/secret-scan/v1archestra-ai/.github/.github/workflows/release-publish.yml

They cover docker.io/archestra/platform, plus mcp-server-base, p4-shim, sandbox-base, and agent-* under ghcr.io/archestra-ai/.

What to know:

  • The SBOMs list the linux/amd64 image. The linux/arm64 image is built from the same source and is covered by the same provenance.
  • An image with a live credential is never released. The secret scan holds counts only, never a secret or where it was found.

Verify Archestra Images

Check the platform image your cluster runs. Each command exits non-zero for an image Archestra did not release.

bash
IMAGE=$(kubectl -n archestra get deployment archestra-platform \
  -o jsonpath='{.spec.template.spec.containers[0].image}')
DIGEST=${IMAGE#*@}

# Built by Archestra's release workflow
gh attestation verify "oci://docker.io/archestra/platform@$DIGEST" \
  --repo archestra-ai/archestra --bundle-from-oci

# Its SBOM, from the same release run
gh attestation verify "oci://docker.io/archestra/platform@$DIGEST" \
  --repo archestra-ai/archestra --bundle-from-oci \
  --signer-workflow archestra-ai/.github/.github/workflows/release-publish.yml \
  --predicate-type https://spdx.dev/Document/v2.3

To check without gh, use cosign with the issuer https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com and the release workflow's identity:

bash
cosign verify-attestation --new-bundle-format --type slsaprovenance1 \
  --certificate-oidc-issuer https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com \
  --certificate-identity-regexp '^https://github\.com/archestra-ai/archestra/\.github/workflows/release-please\.yml@refs/heads/(main|release/[0-9]+\.[0-9]+)$' \
  "docker.io/archestra/platform@$DIGEST"

Stable releases come from refs/heads/release/<major>.<minor>, release candidates from refs/heads/main.

Scan the SBOM

Feed an image's SBOM to your vulnerability scanner instead of pulling and scanning the image yourself. Verify and extract it in one command:

bash
gh attestation verify "oci://docker.io/archestra/platform@$DIGEST" \
  --repo archestra-ai/archestra --bundle-from-oci \
  --signer-workflow archestra-ai/.github/.github/workflows/release-publish.yml \
  --predicate-type https://cyclonedx.org/bom --format json \
  | jq '.[0].verificationResult.statement.predicate' > platform.cdx.json
  • Dependency-Track and other CycloneDX tools: upload platform.cdx.json.
  • Grype, Trivy, and license tools: use --predicate-type https://spdx.dev/Document/v2.3 to get the SPDX file, then run grype sbom:platform.spdx.json or trivy sbom platform.spdx.json.

Admit Only Archestra Images

Make your cluster refuse any Archestra image that Archestra's release workflow did not build. Kyverno and Sigstore policy-controller run in your cluster next to the chart. The chart does not install either.

  • Kyverno: this SigstoreBundle policy rejects a pod whose Archestra image fails the provenance check. Pods with other images pass through.

    yaml
    apiVersion: kyverno.io/v1
    kind: ClusterPolicy
    metadata:
      name: verify-archestra-images
    spec:
      webhookTimeoutSeconds: 30
      rules:
        - name: archestra-build-provenance
          match:
            any:
              - resources:
                  kinds: [Pod]
          verifyImages:
            - type: SigstoreBundle
              failureAction: Enforce
              imageReferences:
                - "docker.io/archestra/platform*"
                - "ghcr.io/archestra-ai/mcp-server-base*"
                - "ghcr.io/archestra-ai/p4-shim*"
                - "ghcr.io/archestra-ai/sandbox-base*"
                - "ghcr.io/archestra-ai/agent-*"
              attestations:
                - type: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1
                  attestors:
                    - entries:
                        - keyless:
                            issuer: https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com
                            subjectRegExp: '^https://github\.com/archestra-ai/archestra/\.github/workflows/release-please\.yml@refs/heads/(main|release/[0-9]+\.[0-9]+)$'
                            rekor:
                              url: https://rekor.sigstore.dev
    
  • Sigstore policy-controller: set signatureFormat: bundle in a ClusterImagePolicy with the issuer and identity above. See Sigstore bundle format.

  • GKE Binary Authorization: its Sigstore signature check verifies only public-key signatures in Artifact Registry, so it cannot check these attestations. On GKE, use Kyverno or policy-controller.

What to know:

  • To admit release candidates nowhere, drop main| from the identity pattern.
  • A registry mirror must copy the attestations with the image: oras cp -r <image>@<digest> <mirror>/<image> does. Point the policy's image references at the mirror.
  • An older release may have its attestations on GitHub only. If --bundle-from-oci finds none, drop the flag to check with GitHub instead.